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Abstract: 
Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and 
higher economic growth? This paper tests Riker’s theory (1964) that the results of fiscal 
decentralization depend on the level of countries’ political centralization. We analyze cross-
section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of 
Riker’s predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous 
local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly 
improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, 
and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local 
politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization. 
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1. Introduction 
Political incentives of public officials determine whether fiscal decentralization is 
beneficial for public goods provision. We define fiscal decentralization as devolution of 
authority over public revenue and expenditure to lower-level government and use this term 
interchangeably with federalism. The three classic channels which make fiscal decentralization 
beneficial – inter-jurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956), informational advantages (Hayek, 
1948), and higher preference homogeneity (Oates, 1972) – all rely on the premise that local 
politicians have political incentives to respond to the needs of local population. A classic cost of 
federalism – regionalist policies in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Musgrave, 
1969; Oates, 1972) – relies on the premise that political incentives of local politicians make them 
cater to their own constituency but ignore preferences of populations in other jurisdictions of the 
country. This logic gives rise to a trade-off between national and local preferences in political 
incentives of local officials in a federation. On the one hand, to realize the benefits of federalism, 
local politicians should have sufficiently high weight placed on the preferences of the population 
of their own jurisdiction. On the other hand, to minimize inter-jurisdictional externalities, local 
politicians should place some weight on voter preferences in other jurisdictions of the country. 
Henceforth, we refer to the latter side of this tradeoff, i.e., to having local political incentives 
aligned with national interests, as political centralization. Since political incentives are shaped by 
political institutions, a fiscally decentralized country needs political institutions that strike a 
balance between the interests of local and national populations. 
Riker, in his seminal book Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (1964), named 
two political institutions that achieve political centralization: strong national political parties and 
administrative subordination (i.e., having central authorities appoint local governments rather 
 3
than having them being elected). According to Riker, only strong national political parties 
achieve the necessary balance between national and local interests. On the one hand, even with 
very strong national political parties, the presence of local elections ensures political 
accountability of local politicians to their constituencies. On the other hand, strong national 
parties align political incentives of local politicians with national objectives by affecting career 
concerns of local politicians. First, strong parties have higher leverage over promotions of local 
politicians to national-level politics compared to weak parties. Second, political support of a 
strong national party during local elections is more valuable to local politicians than that of a 
weak party. Local politicians internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities of their policies in the 
search for promotion and political support by their national governing party because the party 
cares about national-level performance. 
In contrast to strong national political parties, administrative subordination weakens local 
accountability. It solves the problem of inter-jurisdictional externalities by having central-level 
politicians reappoint only those local officials who are “well-behaved” from central officials’ 
point of view. This, however, undermines the benefits of federalism in the first place: in focusing 
on pleasing their bosses, appointed officials may stop caring for the preferences of local 
population even though they know them better than central politicians.  
Recently, several papers pointed to an additional potential cost of federalism – “local 
capture,” namely, the situation when the influence of special interests on public policy is higher 
at the local compared to the central level (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Bardhan, 2002; and 
Sonin, 2003). Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) indicated that, if local governments are more 
vulnerable to capture than central governments, then appointing local officials in a federation is 
beneficial. This condition is very restrictive, however; and it could be the case that neither 
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central nor local authorities serve broad public interests (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Note 
that if this condition holds, strong national parties also help alleviate local capture by creating 
career concerns to resist regional special interests. 
Modern literature has not reached consensus on the overall effect of decentralization in 
developing and transition countries. One strand of the theoretical literature argues that benefits of 
decentralization outweigh the costs (see, for instance, Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, 1995; 
Qian and Weingast, 1996; Qian and Roland, 1998; and Maskin, Qian, and Xu, 2000); whereas 
the other strand argues for the opposite (e.g., Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996; Cai and 
Treisman, 2004; and Bardhan, 2002). Previous empirical studies of the effects of decentralization 
produced inconclusive results that vary across samples and time periods.1 This can be partly 
explained by the fact that these studies overlooked the importance of political institutions. 
Our paper sheds light on this debate by testing Riker’s two predictions about political 
centralization and finding solid empirical support to both. Using cross-section and panel data on 
up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years, we evaluate the effect of national 
political party strength and appointments of local officials on outcomes of fiscal decentralization. 
Our findings are as follows. First, strong political parties (measured by the age of main parties 
and fractionalization of government parties) substantially improve the effect of decentralization 
on growth, public goods provision, and government quality. Second, administrative 
subordination of local authorities to higher-level governments (measured by dummies indicating 
                                                 
1 Fisman and Gatti (2002) and de Mello and Barenstein (2001) found negative effect of decentralization on 
corruption across countries; Treisman (2000) reported no relationship. Zhang and Zou (1998) reported negative 
effect of decentralization on provincial growth in China; whereas Jin et al. (1999) and Lin and Liu (2000) showed 
that this relationship is positive once one filters out cyclical effects. Akai and Sakata (2002) reported positive effect 
of decentralization on growth of US states in early 1990s; while Xie et al. (1999) showed no relationship over 50 
years. Woller and Phillips (1998) found no link between decentralization and growth in developing countries; in 
contrast, Davoodi and Zou (1998) reported negative marginally significant relationship in developing countries and 
no effect in developed countries. Robalino et al. (2001) found negative cross-country relationship between 
decentralization and infant mortality. 
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whether provincial and municipal politicians are appointed or elected) does not significantly 
affect the outcomes of fiscal decentralization. We also provide case study evidence on the 
channel of influence. Comparisons of party systems and decentralizations in two pairs of 
countries – Argentina vs. Chile and Russia vs. China – yield the conclusion that career concerns 
provided by strong national political parties play an important role in disciplining local 
politicians.2 
To the best of our knowledge, the only two papers that consider Riker’s argument are 
Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) and Gennaioli and Rainer (2004). Blanchard and Shleifer build a 
very simple model to illustrate the logic behind the need for political centralization. They argue 
that the stark contrast between outcomes of fiscal decentralization in China and Russia during 
transition can be explained by differences in political centralization of these countries. Gennaioli 
and Rainer confirm that decentralization works better in absence of local capture by showing that 
pre-colonial centralization of tribes in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with better modern 
public goods provision and significantly more so for countries and public goods with higher 
special interest influence. Gennaioli and Rainer, however, do not distinguish between political 
and fiscal decentralization. Our paper shows that fiscal decentralization produces better 
outcomes in countries with political centralization taking the form of strong national political 
parties. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 links theoretical arguments 
to empirical measures and presents testable hypotheses. Section 3 provides case-study evidence 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we restrict our attention to developing and transition countries for two reasons. First, the local 
capture and inter-jurisdictional externalities are more relevant for developing than for developed countries since 
well-functioning democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances substantially limit the scope for 
opportunistic behavior of public officials in developed countries (Bardhan, 2002). And second, two conditions 
necessary for our analysis hold only in developing countries: our measures of national party strength adequately 
reflect career concerns of local politicians only in developing countries; and measures of administrative 
subordination exhibit sufficient variation also only in developing countries. 
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about the channels through which political institutions affect outcomes of fiscal decentralization. 
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 describes the methodology. In section 6, we present the 
results and discuss their robustness. In section 7, we summarize and conclude. 
2. Testable hypotheses and the measures of political institutions 
2.1. Strength of national political parties 
The theoretical argument made by Riker (1964) about the strength of national parties as 
an important determinant of political incentives of the local governments is behind our first 
hypothesis. Strong national political parties influence policies of local politicians by affecting 
their career prospects. The careers of politicians in local governments depend on their parties’ 
political and financial support at the time of their reelection and on the possibility of their 
promotion to the national government. Since stronger parties can provide better careers to their 
members, local politicians place higher weight on the policy preferences of their party when their 
national party is strong.3 In turn, national governing parties have an incentive to punish (i.e., to 
not support or promote) local politicians who pursue regionalist interests because national 
governing parties are evaluated by voters according to overall national performance. 
The best available proxies for the strength of national parties are the age of main parties 
(the average age of the two main governmental parties and the main opposition party) and the 
fractionalization of governing parties (the probability that two members of parliament picked at 
random from governing parties belong to different parties). The motivation behind the use of the 
first measure is as follows. In developing and transition countries, a higher age of main parties 
indicates a more stable party system and stronger political parties (Huntington, 1968). Stability 
                                                 
3 Riker (1964) noted that a necessary condition for strong national parties to have beneficial influence on career 
concerns of local politicians is a direct connection between national and regional political parties. One counter 
example to this is Canada where the link between national and regional parties is rather weak according to Uslaner 
(2000). The data availability does not allow us to take into account the relationship between national and regional 
parties. 
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of political system is an important determinant of career concerns because local politicians take 
the expected horizon of their party into account when making decisions about effort allocation to 
career advancement within the party. The second measure is motivated by the fact that it reflects 
the average relative political weight of each governing political party in national policy-making, 
which is also an important factor in decisions about career advancement for local politicians. 
Low fractionalization of government parties indicates that a government consists of a small 
number of strong parties each having substantial impact on policy decisions; while high 
fractionalization is an indicator of a larger number of weak governing parties each of which has 
little influence over policies. Since the ability to influence policy is what makes national political 
offices attractive, higher government fractionalization, ceteris paribus, results in lower career 
concerns.4 
Using these measures of the party strength, we can formulate a testable prediction: 
Holding everything else constant, younger age of main parties and higher fractionalization of 
government parties according to Riker’s theory is associated with lower efficiency of 
decentralization. We discuss what should be held constant in the next subsection. 
2.1.1. Important covariates 
Both of our measures of political centralization are highly imperfect: they correlate with 
several other variables which may affect decentralization outcomes. To make sure that our 
measures adequately reflect career concerns provided by strong national parties, we use a 
number of covariates. First, government fractionalization depends on the electoral rule and 
government system, both of which can have an independent effect on the efficiency of 
                                                 
4 We consider fractionalization of governing parties rather than fractionalization of parliament as a whole because 
fractionalization in small opposition parties and presence of independent MPs has little effect on local politicians’ 
career concerns. 
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decentralization (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). In order to avoid spurious correlation, we control 
for countries’ government system and electoral rule in regressions for government 
fractionalization as a measure of national party strength. Second, cross-country differences in 
fractionalization of parties and efficiency of decentralization may depend on the degree of 
diversity among voters and on the presence of special ethnically or religiously distinct 
autonomous regions within the federal states. To account for these effects, we control for ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and the presence of contiguous autonomous regions in the country. 
Finally, the age of main parties may reflect the age of countries or age of democracy and, 
therefore, may be correlated with institution-building processes present in young democracies 
which, in turn, could affect decentralization; thus, it is also necessary to control directly for the 
age of countries and the age of democracy (further methodological details are relegated to 
sections 5 and 6.3 which discuss methodology and robustness). 
2.1.2. A reality check 
To the best of our knowledge there is little quantitative comparative analysis of the 
strength of party systems. Data do not allow performing a systematic check of how well the 
cross-country and over-time variation in the average age of main parties and fractionalization of 
government parties reflect the relative weight of national interests in utility functions of local 
politicians. We can check the validity of our measures only for a few special cases. Garman et al. 
(2001) provides cross-sectional ranking of countries according to centralization of political 
parties for five Latin American countries. Among those countries, Brazil and Colombia have the 
most decentralized parties; Argentina is an intermediate case; and Mexico and Venezuela have 
the most centralized political parties. Both of our measures of party strength yield the same 
ranking with the exception of the age of the main parties in Colombia which is an obvious and 
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well-known outlier because of the peculiarity of its party system (Roland and Zapata, 2005).5 
Camp (1998) and Carrion (1998) study the over-time changes in party strength in Mexico and 
Peru. They show that Mexico and Peru experienced a substantial decline in the strength of their 
national parties in the 1990s. A large number of independent candidates and candidates from 
recently-formed new parties were elected as mayors, governors, and legislators. Accordingly, we 
observe a sharp decrease in the average age of main parties and a sharp increase in the 
fractionalization of government parties in both countries at that time. Thus, in these cases our 
measures adequately capture the cross-sectional and over-time variation in the party strength. As 
usual for country-level comparisons, there are few (but notable) exceptions, e.g., Colombia for 
which the two measures perform very poorly (see footnote 6). 
2.2. Administrative subordination 
The literature provides alternative views on whether elections of local officials help or 
hinder efficiency of fiscal decentralization. Seabright (1996) builds a model to illustrate that 
(under certain fairly restrictive assumptions) elected local officials are more accountable 
compared to elected central officials.  Thus, Seabright’s conclusion is that if one ignores the 
problem of inter-jurisdictional spillovers, local elections should help efficiency of fiscal 
decentralization. In contrast, Riker’s (1964) focus is on inter-jurisdictional spillovers. 
Nonetheless, he argues that appointing local governments is not an effective mechanism of 
aligning their incentives with national objectives precisely because appointed local officials lack 
                                                 
5 The fractionalizations of government parties in Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina (0; 0.11; and 0, respectively) 
are noticeably lower that in Brazil and Colombia (0.31, in both countries). The average age of the main parties is 37 
and 39 years old in Mexico and Venezuela, respectively; in Argentina, it is 19 and in Brazil – 10. Colombia is an 
obvious outlier with the average age of the main parties equal to 147 years. According to Roland and Zapata (2005), 
Colombia has a very peculiar system in which parties do not have control over their own party label which allows 
having different party lists with the same party label. In essence, each party in Colombia is a collection of different 
parties which use the same party label rather that single unified party. Thus, our measures of party strength 
significantly overstate party strength in Colombia. A similar system exists in Ecuador but not in any other country. 
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local accountability which is essential to realizing the benefits of decentralization. Riker 
concludes that appointing local public officials does not improve decentralization outcomes 
despite the need for some degree of political centralization. The opposite view is that in 
immature democracies the election mechanism often fails and does not provide accountability 
(Bardhan, 2002); and strong parties are hard to build. Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that 
appointing local politicians is a feasible and effective second-best solution to problems of 
“regionalist policies” and “local capture” in decentralized states. An important assumption 
necessary for their conclusion is that state capture is lower at the central level than at the local 
level. 
We use dummy variables indicating whether municipal and provincial executives are 
elected or appointed to test Riker’s conjecture about effectiveness of administrative 
subordination in disciplining local public officials against the predictions of Blanchard and 
Shleifer’s model. Following Riker, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows: appointment 
(rather than election) of local public officials does not improve outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization. 
3. Case-Study Evidence about the Channels of Influence 
The formal empirical tests in this paper document the link between outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization and our measures of two aspects of political centralization – party strength and 
administrative subordination. The data, however, do not allow us to test for the channels through 
which these political institutions affect efficiency of decentralization. In this section, we consider 
two case studies to illustrate that career concerns of local politicians about promotion to national 
politics is an important channel.  
3.1. Argentina vs. Chile 
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Both Argentina and Chile experienced fiscal decentralizations in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but with a substantial difference in outcomes. About 10% of total government revenues and 
expenditures were shifted from central to subnational budgets in Chile and 15% in Argentina.6 It 
is well documented that in Chile transfer of expenditure responsibilities and financial resources 
from central to municipal governments helped to improve provision of public health (Bossert et 
al., 2003) and education (Winkler and Rounds, 1996; Parry, 1997). In contrast, Argentine 
decentralization is viewed as one of the main reasons for macroeconomic destabilization and a 
large-scale economic crisis (Tommasi et al., 2001). This difference in the results of 
decentralization can be explained by the difference in levels of political centralization and 
national party strength of the two countries.  
Argentine national political parties are weak and the center of the political stage in 
Argentina lies at the provincial level (Corrales, 2002; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Spiller and 
Tommasi, 2003). Patronage, pork barrel politics and clientelism play a much more important role 
in local and province-level elections than the support of a national party (Jones and Samuels, 
2005). Importantly, it is well documented that career paths of Argentine politicians generally 
have a provincial nature: national politicians tend to return home to political posts in their own 
provinces after holding a national office (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi, 2002). Thus, it is 
not only the case that province-level politicians have no political incentives to care about 
national-level performance (they care exclusively about performance of their own province); but 
also that most national-level politicians pursue the interests of their home province.  
In stark contrast, Chile has a strong political party system with parties that are highly 
centralized and national in scope (Londregan, 2000). National party affiliation in Chile is 
                                                 
6 The level of decentralization, of course, has been substantially higher in federal Argentina that in unitary Chile; 
but, for the purposes of this case study, we are interested in the changes rather than levels. 
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important both for local elections and for career concerns of government officials at all levels 
(Scully, 1995 and Eaton, 2004). Municipal political offices offer lucrative career opportunities 
through advancement within the national political parties. Many local politicians, particularly 
from large municipalities, became prominent central-level politicians as a result of being 
promoted by their respective parties following successful terms in local offices.7 At the same 
time, there are no known examples of Chilean politicians who returned to local political arena 
after serving in a central office. 
Overall, in Chile, local politicians have strong career concerns about advancement to the 
central level within national political parties, whereas in Argentina, the most attractive careers 
for politicians are at the provincial level and national parties do not affect political incentives of 
local public officials. Thus, in Chile national political parties serve as a mechanism for 
disciplining subnational authorities and aligning incentives of local politicians with national 
objectives, whereas in Argentina they do not. These differences may account for at least some of 
the differences in the outcomes of decentralization in these two countries.  
3.2. Russia vs. China 
Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) were the first to consider the case of China and Russia. It 
is well-documented that decentralization was a major growth-promoting factor in China and an 
obstacle to growth in Russia (Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005; Zhuravskaya, 2000). Blanchard and 
Shleifer argued that the reason for this is the difference in political centralization of the two 
countries. In China decentralization has taken place under the tight administrative control of the 
communist party, whereas in Yeltsin’s Russia, economic decentralization was accompanied by 
                                                 
7 For example, Joaquin Lavin and Jaime Ravinet, the two former mayors of Santiago, advanced to the very top. 
Lavin (a member of the Independent Democratic Union party) became one of the main opposition leaders. He lost 
1999 presidential election to Ricardo Lagos in a runoff by 200,000 votes and was a close third in the 2005 
presidential race. Ravinet (a member of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy) was the Minister of Defense in 
Lagos’ cabinet in 2004-2006. 
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large-scale political decentralization. Career concerns play an important role in disciplining 
provincial governors in China. Communist party leadership evaluates performance of provincial 
leaders and makes promotion (and dismissal) decisions on the basis of whether each province 
followed growth-promoting policies (Huang, 2002; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; The 
Economist, 2005). In contrast, in Russia, the central government was too weak throughout the 
1990s to extend any influence on regional governors and national parties are at an embryonic 
stage of development. As a result, regional governments often adopted such policies as erecting 
inter-regional trade barriers and issuing money surrogates that imposed significant negative 
externalities on the rest of the country (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 
2006). The comparison between transitions in China and Russia highlight the importance of 
career concerns for local politicians to align their incentives with national objectives.  
4. Data 
We use data on political institutions, fiscal decentralization, government performance, 
economic growth, outcomes of public goods provision, and various control variables for up to 75 
developing and transition countries for the years 1975-2000. The list of countries that constitute 
our sample is given in Table A1 in the appendix. Definitions and sources of all variables are 
given in Table A2 in the appendix. Summary statistics and correlations between the variables are 
also presented in the appendix (Tables A3 and A4). 
We use the share of subnational revenues in total government revenues as the main 
measure of fiscal decentralization we. The results are robust to using the share of subnational 
expenditures in total government expenditures as an alternative measure of fiscal 
decentralization. The data come from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. These measures 
are the most commonly used in the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization. 
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Although they are highly imperfect and do not reflect information on the distribution of decision-
making authority between the levels of government, they provide a useful proxy for the relative 
level of countries’ fiscal decentralization.8  
All measures of political centralization (described in the previous section) were taken 
from the Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) and updated using various 
additional sources (see table A2). As measures of the quality of government we use an index of 
corruption by Transparency International and the World Bank indices of control over corruption, 
quality of governance, regulation quality, and rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2002). To measure 
the quality of public goods provision we use data on the DPT immunization, infant mortality, 
illiteracy rate, and pupil-to-teacher ratio from World Development Indicators by the World 
Bank.9 To measure economic growth, changes in GDP per capita PPP are used. 
5. Methodology 
We use standard methodology for growth regressions and regressions of the quality of 
government (Barro, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000) and add explanatory variables 
that describe the level of fiscal decentralization, political institutions and our focus, their 
interaction term.  
We analyze the effect of political institutions on the efficiency of decentralization taking 
two distinct approaches. First, we study the determinants of cross-sectional variation in the 
quality of government, public goods, and economic growth across countries. Second, we explore 
                                                 
8 An important shortcoming of these data is that they do not distinguish between state and municipal expenditures 
and revenues; this breakdown is available only for a very limited number of countries. 
9 Unlike the other measures of public goods, pupil-to-teacher ratio is not an outcome, but a characteristic of the 
process that might reflect inefficiencies of resource use rather than quality. For many developing countries, 
however, number of teachers reflects a binding constraint. We considered and rejected enrollment in schools as 
another possible measure of the quality of education. It is nonlinear in the level of education: for countries with high 
quality of education, it takes values around 100%, while for countries with poor quality of education it takes values 
either lower or higher than 100%. The values are above 100% when adults go to school.  
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the determinants of short-run over-time variation in public goods provision within countries 
using panel country-fixed-effects regressions.10  
For the purposes of cross-sectional analysis, we use the following regression model: 
iiiiiii εXαDecentrPolit αDecentrαPolitααY +++++= 54321 * , (1) 
where i  indexes countries. Yi is one of the following outcomes: an index of corruption or 
government quality in year 2001 (the year for which data are available); or the logarithm of 
change in GDP per capita at purchasing power parity between 2000 and 1975; or the average 
measure of public goods for years 1975-2000. Politi denotes a measure of political institutions 
described in detail in section 2 above. Decentri denotes a measure of fiscal decentralization. For 
Politi  and Decentri we take average values for the period 1975-2000 or the largest sub-period for 
which data are available in each country. Xi is the following set of control variables: Initial 
values of the logarithm of GDP per capita at PPP and of the logarithm of population; share of 
protestants; ethno-linguistic fractionalization; latitude; legal origin; initial democratic traditions 
(measures by the average value of the democracy index for 50 years up to the initial year); and 
the current level of democracy. In regressions that use fractionalization of governing parties as a 
measure of party strength, the set of control variables also includes dummy variables for 
electoral rule and government system. The initial values are taken from 1975 or the year closest 
to 1975 for which data are available; all other control variables are averages over 1975-2000. In 
the regression for economic growth, we add the following additional control variables measured 
in 1975: the level of fixed investments, openness of economy (measured as the residual share of 
exports and imports in GDP after regressing on area of country and population size), and 
                                                 
10 The data on corruption and the quality of government are only a cross-section. In addition, we cannot use panel 
regressions for the analysis of economic growth due to the insufficient number of observations in five-year averaged 
regressions. 
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logarithm of fertility.11 We estimate equation (1) by 2SLS with the geographical area of 
countries used as an instrument for fiscal decentralization (see discussion in the section 6.4). 
We also use panel regressions with fixed effects to estimate short-run changes in public 
goods provision: 12 
itititititittiit XDecentrPolitDecentrPolitY εββββρα ++++++= 4321  (2) 
where i  indices countries and t  years. Yit is a measure of an outcome of public goods provision. 
As above, Politit and Decentrit denote variables that describe political institutions and fiscal 
decentralization. We control for country and year fixed effects ( iα  and tρ ). Xit is a set of control 
variables that includes logarithm of GDP per capita at PPP lagged one year and logarithm of 
fertility. To eliminate possible endogeneity in panel regressions we instrument political 
institutions, fiscal decentralization, and their interaction term with lagged values. Finally, we 
report standard errors, adjusted to heteroscedasticity, both allowing and not allowing clusters by 
country. 
6. Results 
Figure 1 illustrates our results. The figure presents plots of the residual values from 
regressions of dependent variables on control variables as a function of the interaction term of 
decentralization and measures of party strength. The first row presents the relationship between 
countries, whereas the second row presents the relationship within countries.  
6.1. Strength of the national parties 
                                                 
11 Number of observations per country is different for different countries, and therefore, the over-time averages for 
25 years at a maximum are measured with varied precision. To account for this, in regressions for public goods and 
growth, we weight observations by the square root of the number of years with non-missing data for political 
institutions and decentralization. To account for differences in the measurement accuracy of corruption and 
governance quality indices, we weight observations by the inverse of the standard errors of the indices that are 
provided along with the measures. 
12 As a robustness check, we also run panel regressions with random effects. The results prove to be similar to the 
results of cross-sectional analysis. 
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Table 1 presents cross-section results for the age of main parties. Having older parties 
significantly improves the effect of decentralization on all indices of government quality except 
for the Transparency International index of corruption. A 10% increase in decentralization at a 
level of party age lower than the mean by one half of its standard deviation is associated with a 
decrease in government quality indices of approximately one half of their standard deviations, 
whereas at a level of age of parties higher than the mean by the same amount, the effect of 
decentralization is close to zero. Party age also improves the effect of decentralization on 
immunization, infant mortality, and economic growth. The Pupil-to-teacher ratio also has the 
right sign and is almost statistically significant.13 About 80% of the developing countries in our 
sample have parties younger than needed for decentralization to have a positive effect on indices 
of government quality; but 70% to 90% of them have parties sufficiently old for decentralization 
to be beneficial for public goods provision and economic growth.  
Table 2 presents cross-sectional results for the fractionalization of government parties. 
Fractionalization significantly hampers the effect of decentralization on all outcomes without 
exception.14 Almost a half of the developing countries in our sample have higher 
fractionalization than needed for decentralization to have a positive effect on indices of control 
                                                 
13 A 10% increase in decentralization at a level of party age lower than the mean by one half of its standard deviation 
is associated with decreases in immunization and growth of 11 percentage points and 30%, respectively, and an 
increase in infant mortality of 0.6 percentage points; at the age of main parties higher than the mean by the same 
amount, it is associated with smaller size decreases in immunization and growth of only 5 percentage points and 2%, 
respectively, and a decrease in infant mortality of 0.2 percentage points. 
14 A 10% increase in decentralization, at a level of fractionalization lower than the mean by one half of its standard 
deviation, is associated with an increase in index of corruption and government effectiveness of 35% and 20% of 
standard deviation, respectively, and almost no change in other indices of government quality. In contrast, at a level 
of fractionalization higher than the mean by the same amount, it leads to no change in index of corruption and 
government effectiveness and a decrease in other indices of approximately one third of their standard deviations. A 
10% increase in decentralization at a level of fractionalization lower than the mean by one half of its standard 
deviation leads to 44% increase in 25 years’ economic growth, an increase in the level of immunization of one 
percentage point, a decrease in infant mortality of 5 percentage points, no change in illiteracy level, and a 9% 
decrease in pupil to teacher ratio. In contrast, at a level of fractionalization higher than the mean by the same 
amount, it leads to a 28% increase in economic growth, a decrease in the level of immunization of three percentage 
points, no change in infant mortality, an increase in illiteracy of two percentage points, and a 4% decrease in pupil to 
teacher ratio. 
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of corruption, regulation quality, the rule of law, immunization, and illiteracy, whereas for the 
indices of corruption, government effectiveness, pupil to teacher ratio, infant mortality, and 
economic growth, the share is only 10%. 
The results of panel regressions with fixed effects for party and government 
fractionalization are presented in Table 3. In interpretation of these results it is important to note 
that immunization and pupil to teacher ratio are much more likely to be immediately affected by 
changes in the efficiency of education and healthcare spending compared to illiteracy and infant 
mortality (which probably respond to changes in fiscal policies only with a lag).15 Thus, we 
expect the results in the short-run to come from the former two outcomes of public goods 
provision. Indeed, we find that party age positively significantly affects the immediate effect of 
fiscal decentralization on immunization and the ratio of teachers to pupils. Fractionalization of 
government parties also significantly (negatively) affects the ratio of teachers to pupils. The 
coefficient of the cross-term of the revenue decentralization and government fractionalization in 
regression for immunization also has an expected sign, but is insignificant (with t-statistics above 
unity). Note that there are a few influential observations in each of the panel regressions with 
immunization and pupil to teacher ratio as dependent variables (one or two observations from 
India, Colombia, and Guatemala). None of them increase significance of our results and most 
actually bias the results towards zero. If influential observations are excluded from the sample, 
all of the coefficients of the cross-terms of decentralization and our measures of party strength 
are highly statistically significant and have the expected sign in regressions for immunization 
and pupil to teacher ratio (including the regression with government fractionalization effect on 
immunization which is insignificant in the whole sample.) As a baseline, we report results on the 
                                                 
15  In addition, such measures as infant mortality and illiteracy rates are functions of not just government action but 
also of characteristics of the citizens for which we do not have a proper measure. 
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whole sample which are the most conservative estimates of the within relationship. In contrast, 
there is no short run relationship between illiteracy and infant mortality and our main variable of 
interest.  
Overall, the results are consistent for the two measures of party strength and for cross-
section and panel regressions. Therefore, the data provide strong evidence in favor of Riker’s 
hypothesis that strong national political parties improve the results of fiscal decentralization.  
6.2. Administrative subordination 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the effect of elections of state and municipal 
executives in cross-section regressions. The results are practically absent. There are no 
significant results for the regressions with appointed municipal executives as explanatory 
variation; and in only three out of ten cases, we observe significantly worse outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization in the case when state executives are appointed compared to when they are 
elected. These few significant results, however, are likely to be driven by the omitted variable 
bias because they are inconsistent with the panel data results. Table 6 presents the results of the 
fixed effects panel regressions for administrative subordination. In contrast to the cross-sectional 
correlations, the coefficient of the cross-term between subnational revenue share and the dummy 
for elected state executives is always positive and in the case of the teacher-to-pupil ratio and 
infant mortality – significant. The teacher-to-pupil ratio is also positively and significantly 
affected by the cross-term of decentralization and municipal elections dummy.  
Panel regressions improve on cross-section regressions in two important ways. First and 
foremost, including fixed effects takes care of much of the criticism that the results are driven by 
the unobserved differences between countries. Second, in the panel regressions, we are able to 
instrument measures of political institutions with their lag values. This is not a perfect instrument 
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because our outcome variables may also be persistent, but, arguably, this is better than not 
having instruments, because lags as instruments at least reduce the measurement error bias. Thus, 
we consider cross-section results to be valid only when they are confirmed by panel-regression 
results.  
Overall, we find no robust evidence that administrative subordination helps the outcomes 
of fiscal decentralization. Again, our results are consistent with Riker’s hypothesis that 
administrative subordination is an ineffective mechanism of aligning local political incentives 
with national interests (unlike strong national political parties). 
The next two subsections (6.3 and 6.4) further discuss robustness of our results with 
regard to influential observations, measurement error, sample selection, endogeneity, and 
alternative explanations. Readers not interested in methodological technicalities can directly skip 
to section 7, which summarizes and discusses the results. 
6.3. Sensitivity analysis  
To check sensitivity of the results with respect to influential observations, we estimated 
the same model using robust regressions and excluding China - the most influential observation. 
First, the results of the robust regressions, in most cases, are the same as those of the baseline 
regressions. Several results become insignificant while preserving the sign of coefficients. Few 
results - insignificant in the baseline setting - become significant. All of these results are in line 
with the pattern of the baseline estimation. Second, all results are robust to exclusion of China 
with the exception of cross-sectional results for the effect of the appointment of municipal 
executives (which are sensitive to the presence of China in the sample). In the full sample, the 
effect of fiscal decentralization on government quality is significantly worse when municipal 
executives are appointed compared to when they are elected. Excluding the single observation of 
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China, however, leads to the loss of significance for all of these results. Thus, in the regressions 
for the appointment of municipal executives, we report conservative estimates received on the 
subsample excluding China.  
The results are robust to including the following additional control variables: initial GDP 
per capita squared, federation dummy, regional dummies (Central and Eastern Europe, former 
Soviet Union, Asia, Africa, Middle East, Latin America), colonial dummies (British, Spanish, 
French, and other colonies), average size of jurisdictions and the interaction term of population 
and measures of fiscal decentralization. In addition, results are robust to replacing the across-
time average level of democracy by its initial level.  
The results are robust to exclusion of dictatorships and countries with authoritarian 
regimes from the sample: a few results lose significance whereas most remain significant and 
consistent with the baseline results. 
In the beginning of transition, many post-communist countries experienced initial output 
fall, deterioration in quality of public goods, and economic decentralization. Since we cannot 
account for the nature of these processes, we verified that the exclusion of observations for the 
transition countries before 1995 does not affect the results. 
The age of parties may reflect the country age or the age of democracy. In this case 
institution-building processes that may affect decentralization outcomes could drive our results 
based on party age. In order to rule out this story, we included direct measures of the country age 
since independence and the age of democracy together with their interaction terms with fiscal 
decentralization for all regressions with the party age.16 The results were not affected. 
                                                 
16 As a proxy for the age of democracy we take the number of years since the democratic regime has been 
established for the last time as reported in Polity IV data base. The age of democracy takes zero value if the current 
or any future value of Polity IV measure of democracy is zero. This measure of the age of democracy is only weakly 
correlated with the age of main parties. 
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As discussed above, fractionalization of government parties may reflect the effects of 
other political institutions (i.e., government system and electoral rules) that affect both the 
fractionalization and the results of decentralization. In addition to the inclusion of the dummies 
for electoral rule and government system in the set of control variables, we have used two 
alternatives approaches. First, we used the residuals from the regression of government parties’ 
fractionalization on these dummy variables as an alternative measure of party strength. Second, 
we had a sufficient number of observations to re-estimate regressions on the subsample of 
countries with proportional representation. Each approach produced results very similar to the 
baseline.  
Another potential drawback of fractionalization of government parties as a measure of 
party strength is that high fractionalization may reflect high diversity of population, which may 
influence the outcomes of decentralization. Apart from controlling for ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a country has autonomous or 
self-governing regions (from Beck et al., 2001) and interaction terms of these variables with the 
measures of fiscal decentralization as additional covariates. The results are robust.  
6.4. Endogeneity issues 
Since fiscal decentralization may be endogenous (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Strumpf 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002, Fisman and Gatti, 2002, Panizza, 1999), we use geographical area of 
countries and its interaction term with measures of political centralization as instruments for 
fiscal decentralization and the interaction of decentralization and political institutions in cross-
section regressions.17 The intuition behind this instrument is that, ceteris paribus, costs of 
                                                 
17 Other studies (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; de Mello and Barenstein, 2001) used country legal origin as an instrument. 
It is not an appropriate choice of instrument in our case because legal origin can affect our dependent variables not 
through fiscal decentralization but through other channels (La Porta et al., 1999). Our results support this notion 
because legal origin is often significant. 
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centralized governance increase with geographical size of the country which leads to higher 
economic decentralization in countries with larger area. Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and 
Henderson (2005) demonstrate that the size of the country is an important determinant of fiscal 
decentralization. Table A5 in the appendix reports the first stage regressions with corresponding 
F-statistics. The size of the F-statistics for the interaction term of fiscal decentralization and 
political centralization (which is the focus of our analysis) is high enough and, therefore, the 
instrument is sufficiently strong. In addition, for geographical area to be a valid instrument, 
exclusion restriction needs to be satisfied. Yet in the long run, geographical area can be 
endogenous (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). We assume that 25 years is a sufficiently short 
horizon to treat the area of countries as exogenous.18 Comparison of the results with and without 
instruments for decentralization shows that the signs of coefficients are the same and the 
magnitudes increase considerably. Therefore, we conclude that there may be a bias that 
attenuates coefficients towards zero, probably as a result of a measurement error. 
There is an endogeneity problem in our cross-section regressions that we cannot address. 
The quality of government, economic growth and public goods provision may affect the 
popularity of existing parties and the strength of a country’s party system. Unfortunately, we do 
not have a valid instrument for political institutions under consideration.19 In an attempt to 
account for possible endogeneity, we used the initial levels of the age of main parties and 
                                                 
18 This assumption is supported by the fact that geographical area is insignificant if added in regressions that include 
fiscal decentralization. We should note, however, that almost all the countries in our sample for which the area 
changed since 1975 emerged after the brake up of the former socialist states (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia). Although their resultant size was historically predetermined, there is a possibility that the brake up 
and performance of these countries during transition are related in a way that introduces correlation between the 
geographical area and our dependent variables. 
19 In general, the problem of finding valid instruments for specific political institutions is one of the biggest 
problems in political economy. In a recent paper, Acemoglu (2005) argues that so far no valid instrumental variables 
for specific political institutions were found. All of the instrumental variables used in the literature can be regarded 
at best as valid instruments for broad clusters of institutions that do not allow unbundling the effect of any particular 
institution. 
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government fractionalization instead of across-time averages. The results using initial values of 
political institutions are very similar to those in the baseline regressions. Still, the initial levels 
are not a very good instrument, and possible endogeneity of the strength of political parties is the 
main concern for interpreting our results as causal relationships. 
 Lags are used as instruments in panel regressions for fiscal decentralization, political 
centralization, and their interaction term. For the most part, instrumentation increases the 
magnitude of coefficients while preserving their signs consistent with the measurement error 
explanation of the bias. The only exception is regressions with government fractionalization as a 
measure of party strength. Use of instruments in these regressions leads to a negative shift in the 
point estimates of the coefficients. A possible explanation of this bias is as follows. An increase 
in economic performance can have different effect on fractionalization of governing parties in 
economically centralized and decentralized states. In countries with a low level of 
decentralization, better performance leads to relative strengthening of the national governing 
parties because the success is attributed to national policies. In highly decentralized countries, 
voters attribute economic success to regional policies that may lead to a relative increase in 
fractionalization of national government parties due to strengthening of local political 
organizations. As such, uninstrumented regressions should produce an upward bias in the 
coefficient of the interaction term between government fractionalization and fiscal 
decentralization. This is consistent with our findings. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Our key finding is that political institutions play an important role in determining the 
results of fiscal decentralization. In line with the predictions of Riker (1964), we find that a 
strong national party system is a very effective way of aligning political incentives of local 
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politicians with national objectives, while preserving their accountability to local constituencies, 
which is necessary for efficient decentralization. In developing and transition countries, older 
and more stable party system as well as lower fractionalization of government parties are 
associated with the better effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, government 
quality, and public goods. Our findings also confirm Riker’s skepticism about administrative 
subordination as a mechanism of ensuring efficient political incentives for the local governments 
in decentralized states: we find that appointing state and municipal officials does not help the 
results of fiscal decentralization.  
Therefore, a remedy to poor governance in large inherently decentralized countries is 
building strong national political parties whenever possible. Strong parties help to provide 
elected local officials with efficient political incentives, because their chances of reelection 
depend both on national party support and the satisfaction of the local constituency. This allows 
the striking of a balance between national objectives and local accountability. 
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 Table 1. Party age (cross-section regressions). 
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Share of protestant 0.031 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.257 -0.254 0.080 -0.006 -0.006
(1.99)* (0.07) (0.45) (0.21) (0.60) (1.30) (1.36) (0.28) (1.94)* (0.88)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -2.580 -0.123 -0.267 -0.400 0.183 2.842 -12.362 6.553 0.223 0.013
(1.83)* (0.32) (0.52) (0.91) (0.40) (0.16) (0.81) (0.48) (0.70) (0.02)
Latitude -0.829 2.618 1.545 2.274 3.177 68.007 4.866 7.913 0.774 3.364
(0.17) (2.56)** (1.01) (1.57) (2.44)** (1.02) (0.12) (0.16) (0.83) (1.24)
English legal origin 0.710 -0.070 0.273 -0.175 -0.328 -4.626 -48.053 -29.177 0.174 -0.746
(0.76) (0.24) (1.08) (0.65) (1.18) (0.42) (5.44)*** (3.02)*** (1.37) (2.93)***
Socialist Legal origin -1.237 -1.152 -0.755 -0.831 -1.127 8.694 -19.111 -9.207 0.375 -2.119
(1.41) (4.54)*** (2.66)** (3.15)*** (4.60)*** (1.02) (2.40)** (1.13) (3.18)*** (6.47)***
French legal origin -0.311 -0.076 0.262 -0.162 -0.407 -0.003 -34.646 -22.062 0.134 -0.337
(0.25) (0.22) (0.82) (0.58) (1.41) (0.00) (3.13)*** (1.51) (0.72) (0.66)
Logarithm (Fertility) -0.653
(1.63)
Fixed investments -0.001
(0.09)
Openness 0.005
(1.19)
Observations 53 70 70 69 70 70 70 64 70 70
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.73 0.57 0.67 0.68
Quality of Government Public Goods and Growth 
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2. Fractionalization of government parties (cross-section regressions). 
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CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & -0.184 -0.062 -0.096 -0.074 -0.084 -1.533 -2.136 -0.943 -0.023 -0.067
fractionalization of government parties (2.34)** (3.29)*** (4.68)*** (3.45)*** (4.75)*** (5.33)*** (3.34)*** (1.80)* (2.57)** (2.82)***
Subnational revenue share 0.070 0.023 0.020 0.014 0.015 0.256 0.608 0.027 0.011 0.051
(1.58) (1.74)* (1.42) (0.94) (1.33) (0.72) (1.10) (0.06) (1.54) (1.48)
Fractionalization of government parties 4.429 1.157 1.702 1.256 1.663 14.996 51.619 16.804 0.560 1.170
(2.95)*** (2.54)** (3.44)*** (2.41)** (3.91)*** (1.85)* (3.20)*** (1.35) (3.10)*** (2.04)**
Logarithm (GDP per capita) -0.826 -0.170 0.285 -0.156 -0.133 -4.817 0.502 -1.543 0.012 -0.152
(1.36) (0.88) (1.23) (0.84) (0.77) (1.32) (0.08) (0.24) (0.12) (0.79)
Proportional  electoral rule -0.299 0.285 0.008 0.004 0.167 3.014 -0.690 -1.875 0.059 0.339
(0.48) (1.33) (0.04) (0.02) (0.96) (0.76) (0.08) (0.30) (0.56) (1.29)
Prliamentary system 0.669 0.130 -0.021 0.105 0.011 3.338 18.768 13.218 0.144 -0.361
(2.05)** (1.45) (0.20) (0.93) (0.13) (1.64) (4.82)*** (3.77)*** (3.16)*** (1.77)*
Democratic traditions 0.221 0.037 -0.049 0.077 0.031 0.778 4.821 1.588 0.016 0.017
(2.25)** (0.79) (0.94) (1.58) (0.75) (0.78) (2.88)*** (1.06) (0.77) (0.40)
Current level of democracy 0.008 0.020 0.068 0.034 0.057 0.523 -0.893 0.407 0.013 -0.027
(0.08) (0.53) (1.73)* (0.96) (1.92)* (0.77) (0.72) (0.34) (0.72) (0.59)
Logarithm (Population) -0.107 -0.061 -0.072 -0.047 -0.049 -1.938 -0.377 2.153 -0.026 -0.086
(0.51) (0.86) (0.88) (0.72) (0.84) (1.13) (0.13) (0.87) (0.62) (0.54)
Share of protestant 0.039 0.001 0.009 0.006 -0.001 -0.160 -0.081 0.127 -0.004 -0.002
(3.82)*** (0.11) (1.03) (0.62) (0.10) (1.20) (0.33) (0.41) (1.21) (0.31)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization                            -2.163 -0.361 -0.629 -0.676 -0.125 -13.662 -35.393 -4.266 -0.082 -1.127
(2.51)** (1.01) (1.69)* (2.30)** (0.45) (2.07)** (2.71)*** (0.38) (0.37) (1.68)*
Latitude 1.034 1.538 0.108 1.428 2.150 17.512 -37.180 -11.212 -0.026 -1.181
(0.44) (1.54) (0.12) (1.42) (2.56)** (0.93) (1.00) (0.52) (0.05) (0.58)
English legal origin 0.231 -0.464 0.229 -0.358 -0.681 -5.663 -49.403 -28.554 0.119 -0.778
(0.26) (1.54) (0.74) (1.09) (2.55)** (0.69) (4.99)*** (2.98)*** (0.95) (2.83)***
Socialist Legal origin -1.114 -1.136 -0.407 -0.604 -1.036 9.688 -7.514 -3.110 0.442 -2.427
(1.43) (4.01)*** (1.28) (2.11)** (4.34)*** (1.77)* (0.70) (0.33) (2.98)*** (7.16)***
French legal origin 0.22 -0.26 0.23 -0.14 -0.54 -5.603 -31.274 -18.843 0.064 -0.870
(0.27) (0.71) (0.72) (0.46) (1.93)* (1.01) (2.99)*** (2.16)** (0.46) (1.82)*
Logarithm (Fertility) 0.011
(1.03)
Fixed investments -0.0031
(0.54)
Openness -1.36889
(3.75)***
Observations 55 73 73 72 73 73 73 67 73 73
R-squared 0.50 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.55 0.72 0.76 0.63 0.69 0.61
Quality of government Public goods and growth 
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Party age and fractionalization of government parties (panel regressions). 
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CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & 51.262 -4.757 -0.834 0.459
        age of the main parties (3.09)*** (0.91) (0.67) (2.66)***
(1.72)* (0.98) (0.44) (1.23)
CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & -1.342 0.150 -0.109 -0.014
fractionalization of government parties (1.17) (0.28) (0.90) (1.80)*
(0.92) (0.27) (0.76) (1.52)
Subnational revenue share -1.247 0.031 -0.210 -0.012 0.364 -0.015 -0.157 -0.0001
(2.05)** (0.12) (3.20)*** (1.75)* (0.76) (0.06) (2.74)*** (0.01)
(1.09) (0.08) (1.47) (0.93) (0.54) (0.04) (1.28) (0.01)
Age of the main parties -631.026 -130.170 15.926 -7.951
(1.84)* (1.45) (0.76) (2.62)***
(0.78) (0.98) (0.37) (1.09)
Fractionalization of government parties 11.810 -5.229 2.654 0.425
(0.53) (0.60) (1.26) (2.63)***
(0.43) (0.49) (0.95) (2.13)**
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 33.550 9.846 4.173 0.278 24.452 9.275 3.717 0.160
(4.38)*** (2.73)*** (5.11)*** (3.83)*** (3.54)*** (2.58)*** (4.85)*** (2.87)***
(1.75)* (0.82) (1.53) (1.64) (1.23) (0.88) (1.22) (1.20)
Logarithm (Fertility) -81.650 -27.162 -3.860 -0.217 -93.286 -35.770 -5.972 -0.553
(5.16)*** (3.53)*** (2.34)** -1.420 (5.85)*** (4.34)*** (3.72)*** (4.39)***
(2.11)** (1.65) (0.79) (0.74) (2.75)*** (2.48)** (1.33) (2.23)**
Observations 334 222 416 245 374 248 469 272
Number of countries 48 51 51 45 50 55 54 47
R-squared 0.36 0.65 0.62 0.5 0.38 0.65 0.60 0.53  
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The second set of t-statistics produced by clustering errors by country.  
 *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4. State executives appointed or elected (cross-section regressions). 
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CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & 0.025 -0.078 -0.087 -0.023 -0.057 -1.578 -3.074 -1.798 -0.024 -0.134
   elected state executives (Difference in effects) (0.21) (1.61) (1.71)* (0.36) (1.02) (1.36) (2.00)** (1.52) (1.16) (1.93)*
Subnational revenue share 0.022 0.033 0.028 0.000 0.014 0.418 1.858 0.875 0.016 0.058
    (Effect for appointed state executives) (0.27) (1.01) (0.79) (0.00) (0.41) (0.54) (1.46) (1.03) (1.14) (0.94)
Elected state executives -0.523 0.945 1.184 0.054 0.577 17.565 47.246 25.304 0.526 1.965
(0.29) (1.22) (1.41) (0.06) (0.72) (1.02) (1.70)* (1.20) (1.54) (1.62)
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 0.347 0.272 0.146 0.093 0.114 6.123 31.938 21.317 0.230 -0.231
(0.62) (1.49) (0.78) (0.54) (0.63) (1.49) (3.56)*** (3.01)*** (2.52)** (0.63)
Democratic traditions 0.293 0.002 -0.118 0.072 -0.010 0.553 2.215 0.335 -0.011 -0.064
(1.99)* (0.03) (1.46) (1.28) (0.14) (0.37) (0.74) (0.17) (0.36) (0.67)
Current level of democracy -0.076 0.009 0.098 0.022 0.059 -0.488 -1.637 -0.756 0.009 -0.034
(0.88) (0.17) (1.91)* (0.59) (1.48) (0.66) (0.89) (0.58) (0.48) (0.52)
Logarithm (Population) -0.251 -0.060 -0.098 -0.043 -0.056 -3.034 -5.818 -1.330 -0.062 -0.038
(0.86) (0.58) (0.91) (0.49) (0.59) (1.11) (1.02) (0.36) (1.14) (0.17)
Share of protestant 0.018 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.001 -0.119 -0.171 0.173 -0.005 -0.003
(1.82)* (0.61) (0.87) (0.83) (0.25) (0.99) (0.64) (0.58) (1.58) (0.42)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -2.233 -0.669 -0.852 -0.641 -0.295 -21.879 -55.302 -19.204 -0.177 -1.199
(1.82)* (1.13) (1.54) (1.16) (0.56) (1.88)* (2.29)** (1.11) (0.58) (1.36)
Latitude 1.862 1.396 0.249 1.846 2.267 1.686 -87.267 -43.174 -0.179 -1.002
(0.51) (0.81) (0.14) (1.34) (1.48) (0.05) (0.95) (0.93) (0.22) (0.34)
English legal origin 0.567 0.200 0.590 -0.168 -0.112 1.653 -30.597 -17.307 0.382 0.343
(0.58) (0.46) (1.53) (0.45) (0.29) (0.19) (1.80)* (1.33) (2.02)** (0.44)
Socialist legal origin -0.128 -1.205 -0.938 -0.696 -1.179 5.703 -27.358 -14.963 0.321 -2.904
(0.13) (3.31)*** (2.24)** (1.99)* (3.35)*** (0.66) (1.76)* (1.27) (1.92)* (3.88)***
French legal origin 0.673 0.062 0.369 -0.027 -0.284 -6.805 -35.564 -21.510 0.096 -0.335
(0.73) (0.14) (0.95) (0.09) (0.84) (0.97) (1.66) (2.06)** (0.59) (0.72)
Logarithm (Fertility) 0.035
(2.12)**
Fixed investments 0.001
(0.08)
Openness -1.743
(2.59)**
Observations 50 69 70 68 70 70 70 64 70 70
R-squared 0.34 0.11 0.15 0.42 0.28 0.55 0.52 0.43 0.52 0.47
Subnational revenue share in adjacent regressions 0.047 -0.044 -0.059 -0.024 -0.043 -1.159 -1.216 -0.922 -0.008 -0.076
(Effect for elected  state executives) (0.49) (1.56) (1.81)* (0.51) (1.11) (1.38) (1.19) (1.31) (0.52) (2.09)**
Quality of government Public goods and growth 
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
 34
Table 5. Municipal executives appointed or elected (cross-section regressions). 
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CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & -0.127 -0.011 -0.035 -0.026 -0.023 -0.024 0.648 58.341 -0.012 -0.025
 Elected municipal executives (Difference in effects) (1.00) (0.34) (0.87) (0.68) (0.68) (0.02) (0.47) (0.03) (0.59) (1.29)
Subnational revenue share 0.168 -0.018 -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 -1.619 -1.639 -62.720 0.009 -0.013
   (Effect for appointed municipal executives) (0.94) (0.38) (0.15) (0.20) (0.25) (0.67) (0.89) (0.03) (0.29) (0.39)
Elected municipal executives 2.745 0.231 0.507 0.257 0.284 -17.028 -9.208 -902.440 0.267 0.322
(1.10) (0.36) (0.66) (0.34) (0.41) (0.49) (0.32) (0.03) (0.61) (0.76)
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 0.531 0.180 0.107 0.206 0.104 0.934 20.342 -145.924 0.191 -0.363
(1.29) (1.60) (0.80) (1.48) (0.80) (0.13) (3.73)*** (0.03) (2.74)*** (3.46)***
Current level of democracy 0.224 0.048 -0.051 0.072 0.020 0.573 4.511 -11.919 0.011 0.029
(1.86)* (1.29) (1.29) (2.02)** (0.54) (0.44) (2.78)*** (0.03) (0.56) (0.90)
Democratic traditions -0.013 0.016 0.081 0.037 0.072 1.568 -0.234 39.973 0.006 0.053
(0.14) (0.46) (2.61)** (1.21) (2.31)** (0.80) (0.16) (0.03) (0.24) (1.22)
Logarithm (Population) -0.496 -0.013 -0.007 -0.003 -0.020 3.655 -0.988 11.358 -0.041 0.127
(1.01) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.55) (0.24) (0.03) (0.62) (1.09)
Share of protestant 0.038 -0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.003 -0.218 -0.709 -12.173 -0.003 -0.007
(1.47) (0.15) (0.65) (0.29) (0.33) (0.66) (2.13)** (0.03) (0.73) (1.01)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -3.439 0.246 -0.287 -0.268 0.307 21.532 17.076 950.178 0.041 0.075
(1.10) (0.33) (0.40) (0.33) (0.38) (0.52) (0.51) (0.03) (0.07) (0.14)
Latitude -0.191 3.117 1.641 2.954 3.702 98.215 44.544 885.125 0.300 3.079
(0.03) (2.50)** (0.95) (1.64) (2.26)** (0.96) (0.74) (0.03) (0.30) (1.70)*
English legal origin 1.293 -0.193 0.399 0.007 -0.235 -6.258 -63.554 -647.905 0.200 -0.627
(0.94) (0.49) (1.06) (0.02) (0.60) (0.32) (3.48)*** (0.03) (0.83) (1.90)*
Socialist legal origin -1.313 -1.262 -0.764 -0.904 -1.255 10.452 -31.929 -176.364 0.304 -2.310
(1.13) (4.36)*** (2.38)** (3.30)*** (4.40)*** (0.78) (2.95)*** (0.04) (2.60)** (9.56)***
French legal origin 0.492 -0.132 0.412 0.048 -0.319 7.173 -43.333 -464.032 0.118 -0.472
(0.27) (0.37) (1.02) (0.13) (0.91) (0.34) (3.03)*** (0.03) (0.80) (1.51)
Logarithm (Fertility) 0.010
(1.01)
Fixed investments 0.002
(0.97)
Openness -0.460
(1.10)
Observations 52 68 69 67 69 69 69 62 69 69
R-squared 0.15 0.39 0.32 0.5 0.44 0.36 0.7 0.02 0.66 0.76
Subnational revenue share in adjacent regressions 0.045 -0.008 -0.025 -0.019 -0.017 -1.643 -0.991 -4.379 -0.003 -0.038
(Effect for elected  municipal executives) (0.63) (0.42) (1.16) (0.94) (0.83) (1.26) (1.18) (0.04) (0.18) (1.70)*
Quality of government Public goods and growth 
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
Observations for China are excluded. 
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Table 6. State and municipal executives appointed or elected (panel regressions). 
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CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & 0.105 0.382 0.083 0.048
   elected state executives (Difference in effects) (0.12) (1.83)* (1.35) (3.65)***
(0.06) (2.07)** (0.65) (2.95)***
CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & -13.866 -0.355 -0.526 0.145
 Elected municipal executives (Difference in effects) (0.45) (0.74) (0.14) (4.68)***
(0.26) (0.83) (0.14) (3.37)***
Subnational revenue share -21.320 -8.876 -0.833 -1.091 13.754 0.277 0.396 -0.135
    (Effect for appointed  executives) (1.43) (1.73)* (0.62) (3.64)*** (0.45) (0.64) (0.11) (4.57)***
(0.18) (1.13) (1.55) (2.10)** (0.26) (1.00) (0.10) (3.48)***
Elected state executives 3.423 17.478 7.207 0.099 
(0.430) (4.03)*** (7.61)*** (0.930)
(0.73) (1.82)* (0.36) (3.35)***
Elected municipal executives 360.18 16.133 13.337 .
(0.45) (1.03) (0.14) (.)
(0.26) (1.42) (0.14) (.)
Logarithm (GDP per capita) -48.491 -43.047 -5.673 0.320 25.145 15.298 2.036 0.057
(3.38)*** (6.24)*** (4.12)*** (1.37) (2.53)** (5.04)*** (2.17)** (0.87)
(0.19) (1.68) (3.40)*** (0.45) (1.20) (1.48) (0.61) (0.40)
Logarithm (Fertility) -0.353 -0.337 -0.241 -0.041 -33.864 -19.812 -5.082 -0.724
(0.390) (1.490) (3.36)*** (2.89)*** (1.65)* (3.17)*** (2.54)** (5.06)***
(1.48) (2.46)** (1.25) (0.55) (0.85) (1.19) (1.03) (3.18)***
Observations 237 181 276 148 330 271 407 217
Number of countries 35 36 33 25 49 49 46 41
R-squared 0.56 0.73 0.66 0.36 0.15 0.72 0.61 0.06
Subnational revenue share in adjacent regressions -0.247 0.045 -0.158 0.007 -0.113 -0.078 -0.129 0.010
(Effect for elected  state executives) (0.64) (0.23) (3.57)*** (0.99) (0.18) (0.38) (1.80)* (1.55)
(0.35) (0.25) (3.06)*** (0.86) (0.12) (0.25) (1.12) (1.10)  
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The second set of t-statistics produced by clustering errors by country. 
 Regression with the variable for municipal executives do not include China.  
 *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
 
 36
.Figure 1. Illustration of the estimated relationships: partial residual scatter plots 
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Party age and effect of decentralization on the rule of law index in 
cross-section 
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Fractionalization of government parties and effect of decentralization 
on pupil to teacher ratio, within relationship 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Countries included in the sample 
Albania* 
Argentina 
Armenia* 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain* 
Bangladesh 
Belarus* 
Benin*† 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Republic of Congo* 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus* 
Czech Republic 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia* 
Fiji* 
Gambia* 
Georgia* 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan* 
South Korea 
Latvia 
Madagascar* 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia* 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea* 
Paraguay* 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Sri Lank* 
Swaziland*† 
Tajikistan* 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Note: * denotes countries for which the Transparency International index of corruption (one of 
our outcome variables) is unavailable. † For Benin and Swaziland the index of control over 
corruption is unavailable. For Swaziland the index of government effectivenes is unavailable as 
well. In all regressions, we exclude observations for socialist countries before the beginning of 
transition because economic institutions in these countries (i.e., central planning systems) were 
different in nature. 
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Table A2. Description of the variables 
Variable Description 
Subnational revenue 
share 
Share of revenues of all subnational governments in total revenues of consolidated central 
budget measured in percents. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators, 
by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. Data from 
Government Finance Statistics 2001 was added. For Armenia, Korea, and Pakistan data 
were added using information from national statistical offices. 
Subnational expenditure 
share 
Share of expenditures of all subnational governments (net of transfers to other levels of 
government) in total expenditures of consolidated central budget measured in percents. 
Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators20, by the World Bank, based 
on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. Data from Government Finance Statistics 2001 
was added. For Armenia, Korea, and Pakistan data were added using information from 
national statistical offices. 
Fractionalization of 
government parties 
The probability that two members of parliament picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties. Missing if there is no parliament, if there 
are any government parties where seats are unknown or if there are no parties in the 
legislature. Scale from 0 to 1. Observations for Thailand prior to 1989 are excluded, 
because they are inconsistent with the description of the Thai government provided by 
Hicken (2004). Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3, (Beck et al., 2001). 
Fractionalization of 
parliament  
The probability that two members of parliament picked at random from the legislature will 
be of different parties. Missing if there is no parliament, if there are no parties in the 
legislature and if any government or opposition party seats are missing. Scale from 0 to 1. 
Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001). 
Party age This is the average of the ages of the first government party, second government party, 
and 1st opposition party, or the subset of these for which age of party is known. The 
variable is measured in thousands of years. Source: Database on Political Institutions, 
Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001). 
Elected municipal 
executives 
Equals one if local executive is locally elected. Equals zero otherwise.  No information, or 
no evidence of municipal governments, is recorded as missing.  If one source has 
information on a specific period, and the other has no information on a different period, 
we do not extrapolate from one source to another - no information is always recorded as 
missing.  If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the lowest 
level as the “municipal” level.  Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3 (Beck 
et al., 2001), updated using Nickson (1995) and various other sources. 
Elected state/province 
executives 
Equals one if state/province executive is locally elected. Equals zero otherwise.  If there 
are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the 
“state/province” level. Indirectly elected state/province governments, where directly 
elected municipal bodies elect the state/province level, are not considered locally elected. 
Indirectly elected state/province governments elected by directly elected state/province 
bodies are considered locally elected. Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 
3 (Beck et al., 2001), updated using Nickson (1995) and various other sources. 
Share of protestants  Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the Protestant 
religion in 1980. Scales from 0 to 100. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Latitude The absolute latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Source: La 
Porta et al. (1999). 
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of the country. There 
are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) 
German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5) Socialist/Communist 
laws. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Continued. 
                                                 
20 Database can be found at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/de centralization/dataondecen.htm. 
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Table A2. Continued. 
Variable 
Description 
Parliamentary system Systems with unelected executives (those scoring a 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of 
Political Competitiveness – to be defined below) get a 0. Systems with presidents who are 
elected directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in 
cases where there is no prime minister, also receive a 0. In systems with both a prime 
minister and a president, we consider the following factors to categorize the system: 
a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to 
override the veto. 
b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and/or other 
ministers.  
c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 
d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM 
then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential (Romania, 
Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Yugoslavia). 
The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If no information or 
ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d). Countries in which the legislature elects 
the chief executive are parliamentary (2). Source: Database on Political Institutions, 
Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001). 
Proportional electoral 
rule 
“1” if candidates are elected based on the % of votes received by their party and/or if our 
sources specifically call the system “proportional representation”. “0” otherwise. Source: 
Database on Political Institutions, Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001), updated using various 
other sources.  
Control over corruption A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain, of a 
large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-
governmental organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 
and 2001. Units range from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002).21 
Government 
effectiveness 
A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures and the credibility 
of government’s commitment to policies of a large number of survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001. Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Regulation quality A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perception of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development of a large number of survey respondents 
in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001. Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Rule of law A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the 
incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts of a large number of survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001. Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Corruption indices The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes for years 2000 and 2001 
respectively. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes.  Source: Transparency International22 
Continued. 
                                                 
21 Paper can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters2.pdf. 
22 Indices can be found at http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/. 
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Table A2. Continued. 
Variable Description 
Immunization Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 months). Child immunization measures the 
rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A child is considered 
adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus 
(DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: World 
Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Infant mortality Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 
1000 live births in a given year. Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the 
World Bank 
Illiteracy Adult illiteracy rate is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who cannot, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Scale from 
0 to 100. Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Pupil to teacher ratio Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school 
divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their teaching 
assignment). Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Fixed investments Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). Gross fixed capital formation (gross domestic 
fixed investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also 
considered capital formation.  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World 
Bank 
GDP per capita, PPP GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international 
dollars. Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Population  Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship-except for refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of 
their country of origin. Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Openness  Error term from the linear regression of the share of export and import in GDP (measured 
in percent) on the area and population of the country. Source: Constructed based on data 
from World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Fertility Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she 
were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the 
World Bank 
Current level of 
democracy 
Index of democracy. Scale from 0 to 10 with higher values corresponding to more 
democratic outcomes. Source: Polity IV Dataset. 
Democratic traditions  Average index of democracy for the last 50 years. Scale from 0 to 10 with higher values 
corresponding to more democratic outcomes. Source: constructed based on data from 
Polity IV Dataset. 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization for the year 1985. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. 
Source: Roeder, P. G. (2001).23 
                                                 
23 Philip Roeder, G. (2001). "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985," February 16. The index can be 
found at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm. 
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Table A3. Summary statistics (for over-time country averages) 
Variable # of obs Mean SD Min Max
Share of subnational revenues 75 13.71 12.33 1.07 52.43
Share of subnational expenditures 73 16.46 13.56 1.74 55.16
Municipal executives elected 70 0.58 0.43 0 1
State executives elected 70 0.18 0.33 0 1
Fractionalization of governing parties 73 0.22 0.24 0 1
Average age of main parties 70 0.02 0.03 0 0.15
Proportional electoral rule 75 0.63 0.48 0 1
Parliamentary system 75 0.30 0.43 0 1
Level of  DPT immunization 75 72.63 15.98 26.89 99.75
Negative of logarithm of infant mortality 75 -45.67 32.90 -141.59 -7.02
Negative of illiteracy level 68 -23.80 21.06 -76.37 -0.20
Negative of logarithm of pupil to teacher ratio 75 -28.96 11.47 -63.54 -11.23
Transparency International index of corruption 55 3.55 1.36 0.4 7.6
Index of government effectiveness 74 4.52 0.96 1.88 5.85
Index of regulation quality 75 2.91 0.64 1.57 3.79
Index of control over corruption 73 4.90 1.08 1.55 6.52
Index of rule of law 75 4.75 1.09 1.93 6.46
 
 
Table A4. Correlation coefficients (for over-time country averages) 
Municipal 
executives elected
State executives 
elected
Fractionalization of 
governing parties
Average age of 
main parties
Share of subnational revenues 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.27***
Municipal executives elected 0.49*** 0.08 0.16*
State executives elected -0.06 0.33***
Fractionalization of governing parties -0.03  
Note: *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. 
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Table A5. First-stage regressions for the IV regressions. 
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Area 3.077 -0.723 0.454 -0.019 2.515 -0.757 1.661 -0.262
[2.44]** [2.35]** [0.67] [1.68]* [1.21] [0.49] [1.27] [0.94]
Area*(Fractionalization of 
government parties) -3.720 2.427
[1.76]* [4.72]***
Area*(Age of the main parties) 58.781 5.223
[1.86]* [10.22]***
Area*(Elected municipal executives) -1.743 1.719
[0.80] [1.06]
Area*(Elected state executives) -0.942 2.434
[0.34] [4.08]***
Fractionalization of government 
parties -4.755 9.306
[0.75] [6.04]***
Age of the main parties -61.197 9.076
[0.92] [8.43]***
Elected municipal executives -8.398 6.420
[2.03]** [2.08]**
Elected state executives -10.953 6.746
[2.32]** [6.70]***
Logarithm (GDP per capita) -1.478 -0.564 -2.232 -0.023 -2.431 -0.387 -3.034 0.388
[0.74] [1.15] [1.14] [0.72] [1.19] [0.26] [1.30] [0.78]
Current level of democracy 0.136 0.110 -0.169 0.004 0.855 0.625 0.155 -0.176
[0.20] [0.66] [0.25] [0.33] [1.20] [1.18] [0.22] [1.19]
Democratic traditions 0.144 0.104 0.480 -0.005 0.133 0.012 0.993 0.030
[0.16] [0.49] [0.57] [0.39] [0.16] [0.02] [1.05] [0.15]
Logarithm (Population) 1.482 1.020 1.677 0.000 3.438 3.465 2.173 0.247
[1.29] [3.66]*** [1.53] [0.01] [3.06]*** [4.15]*** [1.94]* [1.03]
Share of protestant -0.134 0.006 -0.138 -0.002 -0.078 0.074 -0.050 -0.006
[1.19] [0.21] [1.22] [1.18] [0.66] [0.84] [0.44] [0.25]
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 17.421 2.014 16.693 0.266 15.742 2.120 14.984 0.128
[2.52]** [1.20] [2.38]** [2.34]** [2.48]** [0.45] [2.29]** [0.09]
Latitude 42.042 5.104 50.422 0.455 47.658 37.023 39.024 3.719
[2.91]*** [1.45] [3.33]*** [1.86]* [3.52]*** [3.67]*** [2.69]*** [1.21]
English legal origin -5.792 -0.102 -4.426 -0.128 -1.977 8.698 -11.138 -1.633
[0.51] [0.04] [0.39] [0.69] [0.19] [1.10] [0.99] [0.68]
Socialist legal origin -2.457 3.212 -2.272 -0.117 3.061 4.003 -0.111 -3.026
[0.22] [1.19] [0.20] [0.64] [0.29] [0.51] [0.01] [1.28]
French legal origin 0.105 2.097 4.543 -0.067 6.595 13.742 -0.348 -1.385
[0.01] [0.78] [0.40] [0.37] [0.63] [1.76]* [0.03] [0.60]
Observations 73 73 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.49 0.74 0.51 0.88 0.56 0.67 0.51 0.78
F-statistics 3.22 17.25 3.11 57.20 1.62 2.36 2.22 24.73
 Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - 
significant at 10% level. F-statistics provided for testing the hypothesis that the coefficient for Area and the 
coefficient for the cross-term of Area and the corresponding political variable both equal zero. 
